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Abstract
A government agency delegates to a provider (hospital, medical
gatekeeper, school, social worker) the decision to supply a service or
treatment to individual recipients. The agency does not perfectly
know the distribution of individual treatment costs in the population.
The single-crossing property is not satisfied when the uncertainty per-
tains to the dispersion of the distribution. We find that the provision
of service should then be distorted upwards relative to efficiency when
the (first-best) efficient number of recipients is sufficiently high.
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1 Introduction
We consider a government agency in charge of supplying a service or treat-
ment to a population of potential recipients. We assume that the cost and
the benefit of the treatment vary across individuals. Efficiency requires that
the treatment is provided to an individual if and only if social benefit exceeds
social cost for that individual.
The individual heterogeneity in cost and benefit may in part be explained
by recipients’ characteristics that are observed by the agency. To some extent,
the agency can thus use “rationing by denial”, whereby the treatment is
denied to individuals with unfavorable cost-benefit ratio. In many instances,
however, there remains substantial unobserved heterogeneity conditional on
observable variables. The agency has then to leave the selection of recipients
to the discretion of the service provider, i.e. rely on “rationing by selection”,
see [3]. In practice, the supply decision is indeed delegated to the provider for
various services, e.g. medical or social care, after-school or training programs.
Under rationing by selection, the agency first determines the total num-
ber of recipients. This step requires knowing the distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity among potential recipients. Perfect knowledge of the distribu-
tion is commonly assumed in the literature. For instance, the assumption is
made in [5] and [4], with the former article considering many treatment vari-
eties and the latter investigating provider altruism –two issues not addressed
here.
The present note places the emphasis on the uncertainty about the dis-
tribution of unobserved heterogeneity. The composition of the population of
recipients addressed by a given provider depends on local conditions, creat-
ing significant variation in the underlying distributions across providers. The
effect of differences in composition on the cost and benefit distributions is
difficult to estimate empirically (see [6] for a recent survey).
Accordingly, we relax the assumption that the agency perfectly knows
the cost and benefit distribution in the population of potential recipients.
We find that the uncertainty about the distribution of heterogeneity causes
the number of recipients to be distorted relative to efficiency. The direction
of the distortion depends on whether the uncertainty pertains to the mean
or to the dispersion of individual treatment costs. In the former case, the
usual Spence-Mirrlees condition is satisfied and the distortion is necessarily
downwards: The number of treated recipients is lower than recommended
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by first-best efficiency. In the latter case, the Spence-Mirrlees condition no
longer holds. We find that the first-best optimum governs the the sign of
distortion in the second-best program: The distorsion is upwards when the
first-best number of treated recipients is sufficiently high. Uncertainty about
the cost dispersion then pushes towards universal coverage policies.
2 Model
A population of recipients, whose size is normalized to one, is eligible for
a treatment supplied by a single provider. Recipients are indexed by two
nonnegative real numbers b and c, with distribution function Φ(b, c). The
treatment of a type (b, c) recipient yields benefit b to the recipient and costs
c to the provider. The corresponding net social benefit is b− (1+λ)c, where
λ is the (exogenously given) marginal cost of public funds.
Assumption 1. The (expected) net social benefit of treatment for a given
cost level c, E(b | c)− (1 + λ)c, is a non-increasing function of cost c with a
unique zero, denoted by c∗∗.
Assumption 1 holds true in particular when the expected benefit decreases
with cost, a case often considered in the literature, e.g., in [2] and [4]. [5]
provides health related examples where this assumption is relevant. Under
this assumption, the first-best requires to treat recipients with cost c ≤ c∗∗.
Denoting by F the marginal distribution of individual treatment costs in the
population of recipients, the first-best optimal number of treated recipients
is n∗∗ = F (c∗∗).
In this paper, we assume that the agency relies on rationing by selec-
tion: the agency observes the number n of recipients but not their individual
characteristics. The treatment decision is delegated to a single provider who
observes the individual characteristics of recipients. The agency offers a take
or leave contract specifying the number of recipients that must be treated
by the provider and a compensating transfer T . The utility of the provider
when she accepts the contract is U(n, T ) = T −C(n), where C(n) represents
the aggregate cost of treating n recipients.
Given (n, T ), utility maximization requires that the least costly recipients
be treated in priority. The provider’s cost of treating n recipients, 0 ≤ n ≤ 1,
3
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is therefore given by
C(n) =
∫ F−1(n)
0
c dF (c).
The marginal cost is C ′(n) = F−1(n), i.e., the cost of the marginal treated
recipient is F−1(n), the nth-percentile of the distribution F . It follows that
the cost function C(n) is convex in n.
The net social benefit of treating n recipients is given by S(n) = B(n)−
(1 + λ)C(n), where
B(n) =
∫ F−1(n)
0
E(b | c) dF (c).
represents the (expected) the gross social benefit. Under Assumption 1,
the net social benefit function S(n) is concave in n, reaching its maximum
at n∗∗ = F (c∗∗). When the agency knows the distribution of individual
recipients characteristics Φ, it can choose the number of recipients n and the
transfer T that maximize
B(n) + U(n, T )− (1 + λ)T = S(n)− λU(n, T )
subject to the provider’s participation constraint U(n, T ) ≥ 0. The solution
to this maximization problem is the first-best optimum, n = n∗∗ and U =
U∗∗ = 0.
Under Assumption 1, the provider treats in priority the recipients with
highest expected social values: The social net benefit and the provider’s
private objective are ‘aligned.’ Hence, the agency can achieve the first-best
optimum if it knows the distribution of individual recipients characteristics:
From the distribution function Φ, the agency infers the optimal number n∗∗
and the corresponding cost, C(n∗∗). It is then sufficient to ask the provider
to treat n∗∗ recipients and reimburse C(n∗∗).
3 Unknown cost distribution
We now relax the assumption that the agency knows the distribution of indi-
vidual characteristics of recipients. We suppose that the agency only knows
that the distribution function is Φi (i = H,L), associated with marginal cost
distribution Fi, with probability pii (piL + piH = 1). The true distribution
function is private information to the provider. We refer to i as the provider
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type. Hence, the agency is faced with two types of provider, themselves con-
fronted with different populations of recipients and marginal distributions of
individual costs. Provider i has cost function Ci(n) with C
′
i(n) = F
−1
i (n),
and the net social benefit of having n recipients treated by provider i is
Si(n) =
∫ F−1
i
(n)
0
[Ei(b | c)− (1 + λ)c ] dFi(c),
where the conditional expectation Ei is taken under provider i’s distribu-
tion Φi. Assumption 1 is supposed to hold for the two provider types: The
first-best cost threshold for provider i is c∗∗i such that Ei(b | c
∗∗
i ) = (1+λ)c
∗∗
i ,
where Ei(b | c
∗∗
i ) represents the mean treatment benefit for provider i in
the population of recipients whose treatment cost is c∗∗i . The corresponding
first-best number of recipients is n∗∗i = Fi(c
∗∗
i ).
Appealing to the revelation principle, the agency offers a menu (ni, Ti),
i = H,L, maximizing
∑
i
pii [Si(ni)− λUi(ni, Ti)]
subject to the provider’s participation constraints Ui(ni, Ti) = Ti−Ci(ni) ≥ 0
and the incentive constraints Ui(ni, Ti) ≥ Ui(nj, Tj) for all i, j = H,L.
We examine how the solution to this problem departs from the first-best
optimum when the marginal distribution FL stochastically dominates the
distribution FH .
3.1 Local distortions
Suppose first that FL first-order stochastically dominates FH : FL(c) ≤ FH(c)
for all c, with strict inequality on a non-degenerated interval. In this case,
for all n > 0, provider H’s marginal cost stands below provider L’s:
C ′H(n) = F
−1
H (n) < C
′
L(n) = F
−1
L (n),
and hence CH(n) < CL(n), since CH(0) = CL(0). The first-best menu
(n∗∗i , Ci(n
∗∗
i )) is not incentive compatible: Provider H chooses (n
∗∗
L , CL(n
∗∗
L ))
and earns CL(n
∗∗
L )− CH(n
∗∗
L ) > 0. In order to reduce the informational rent
CL(nL) − CH(nL) of the type H provider, the agency distorts the number
5
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of recipients treated by type L with respect to the first-best n∗∗L . The usual
single-crossing condition is satisfied:
∂T
∂n
∣∣∣∣
UH
= C ′H(n) < C
′
L(n) =
∂T
∂n
∣∣∣∣
UL
for all n.
Therefore a lower rent requires a lower number of recipients treated by
provider L. This is the standard pattern in adverse selection problems.
Proposition 1. Suppose that FL first-order stochastically dominates FH . At
the second-best optimum, provider H (provider L) treats the optimal number
of (too few) recipients and earns a positive (zero) profit.
Proof. Since CL(n) > CH(n), the type H incentive constraint is binding,
U∗H = CL(n
∗
L) − CH(n
∗
L), and U
∗
L = 0. The optimal number n
∗
L satisfies the
first-order condition
piLS
′
L(n
∗
L)− λpiH [C
′
L(n
∗
L)− C
′
H(n
∗
L)] = 0. (1)
Thus S ′L(n
∗
L) > 0 = S
′(n∗∗L ), and S(n) being single-peaked, n
∗
L < n
∗∗
L . Type
H treats n∗H = n
∗∗
H recipients and earns U
∗
H = CL(n
∗
L)− CH(n
∗
L) > 0.
The main result of the paper concerns the case where FH is a mean-
preserving spread of FL: Both distributions FH and FL have the same mean,
CL(1) =
∫
∞
0
c dFH(c) =
∫
∞
0
c dFL(c) = CH(1),
and FL second-order stochastically dominates FH ,∫ c
0
FL(c) dc ≤
∫ c
0
FH(c) dc for all c.
Assumption 2. The two distribution functions cross only once, at some
individual treatment cost denoted cˆ.
The single-crossing property does not hold, but Assumption 2 restricts
the pattern of violation of this assumption, delimitating two different regions:
∂T
∂n
∣∣∣∣
UH
= C ′H(n) < C
′
L(n) =
∂T
∂n
∣∣∣∣
UL
⇐⇒ n < nˆ, (2)
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with nˆ = FL(cˆ) = FH(cˆ). In the spirit of [1], we use this partition to handle
the adverse selection problem.1
Proposition 2. Suppose that FH is a mean-preserving spread of FL and that
Assumption 2 holds. Then, provider’s H incentive constraint is the only one
to be binding at the optimum. This provider treats n∗∗H recipients.
The agency has a local incentive to distort the number of recipients treated
by provider L upwards from n∗∗L if and only if n
∗∗
L > nˆ.
Proof. By Assumption 2, FH(c) > FL(c) for c < cˆ and FH(c) < FL(c) for
c > cˆ. Using the expression of the marginal costs, we find that C ′H(n) <
C ′L(n) for n < nˆ and C
′
H(n) > C
′
L(n) for n > nˆ. Since CH(0) = CL(0) and
CH(1) = CL(1), we have
CH(n) ≤ CL(n)
for all n, with equality for n = 0 and n = 1. The cost difference CL(n)−CH(n)
first increases, then decreases as n rises, achieving its maximum at nˆ =
FH(cˆ) = FL(cˆ). The efficient provider, provider H, is the one faced with
more dispersed individual treatment costs.
It follows that at the second-best optimum, H’s incentive constraint must
be binding, U∗H = CL(n
∗
L)− CH(n
∗
L), and U
∗
L = 0. The number of recipients
treated by provider H is undistorted. The optimal number n∗L of treated by
the L type maximizes
K(n) ≡ piLSL(n) + λpiH [CH(n)− CL(n)]. (3)
The first derivative of this function at n∗∗L is λpiH [C
′
H(n
∗∗
L ) − C
′
L(n
∗∗
L )], since
SL(n
∗∗
L ) = 0. By (2), it is positive if and only if n
∗∗
L > nˆ.
Figures 1 and 2 describe how to derive the aggregate cost function from
the marginal distribution of individual cost. By Assumption 2 the marginal
distributions intersect at cˆ. From the second order stochastic dominance
property we also know that FH(c) is above (below) FL(c) for c less (greater)
than cˆ. Therefore, the slope of the cost function for provider H is less
(greater) than the slope of the cost function for provider L when n is less
(greater) than nˆ. This change in the way the slopes are ordered implies a fail-
ure of the usual single-crossing condition. However, given that both providers
1In our setup, however, C ′
H
(n)−C ′
L
(n) is non-monotonic in n, hence [1]’s Assumption
A2 does not hold.
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Figure 2: Aggregate cost function
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Figure 3: Downward distortion
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Figure 4: Upward distortion
have the same aggregate costs at n ∈ {0, 1}, provider’sH aggregate cost must
be lower for all n ∈ (0, 1).
The intuition is simple: When n recipients are treated, the individual
treatment costs are concentrated around the mean CL(1) for provider L
and are more dispersed for provider H. The latter provider treats in pri-
ority the least costly recipients, which gives him a cost advantage relative to
provider L, that advantage being maximal for n = nˆ. Though the single-
crossing condition is not met, type L (H) is unambigously the ‘inefficient’
(‘efficient’) type, i.e., CL(n) ≥ CH(n) for all n, thus allowing us to handle
with incentive constraints.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate how the failure of the Spence-Mirrlees condition
can be exploited by the agency to reduce the type H informational rent
CL(nL)− CH(nL). The iso-utility curves are increasing and convex in n. In
the first-best, both types would earn zero utility: The corresponding iso-
utility curves pass through the origin n = T = 0. If the first-best contracts
were offered, type H would imitate type L by choosing to treat n∗∗L recipients.
Provider H would then earn a positive profit T ∗∗L − CH(n
∗∗
L ) = CL(n
∗∗
L ) −
CH(n
∗∗
L ) > 0 (dotted iso-utility curve). In order to lower this rent, the agency
9
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has a local incentive to reduce the number of treated by the L type when
n∗∗L < nˆ, as is the case in Figure 3. On the contrary, n
∗∗
L > nˆ in Figure 4,
and the agency then has a local incentive to increase the number of treated
above n∗∗L .
Thus, unlike the main strand of the literature, the sign of the local dis-
torsion from the first-best optimum in the second-best setup are driven by
the number of treated in the first-best problem: A high number of treated
in the first-best yields an upward distorsion.
3.2 A global result
Previous results describe the pattern of local incentives to distort the number
of treated recipients from the first-best. However it could be that the global
optimum involves to treat n∗L < n
∗∗
L recipients in the case where n
∗∗
L is above
nˆ. To go beyond the local result of Proposition 2, we introduce
Assumption 3. The distributions FL and FH are symmetric around cˆ, i.e.
Fi(c) + Fi(2cˆ− c) = 1 for all c and i = H,L.
Under Assumptions 2 and 3, the distributions are equal to one half when
they cross: nˆ = FH(cˆ) = FL(cˆ) = 1/2.
Proposition 3. Suppose that Assumptions 2 and 3 hold, FH is a mean-
preserving spread of FL, and n
∗∗
L is larger than 1/2. Then the number of
recipients treated by provider L is distorted upwards if SL(1) > SL(1− n
∗∗
L ).
Proof. By Assumption 3, the rent UH(nL) = CL(nL)−CH(nL) is symmetric
around its global maximum nˆ = 1/2, i.e. UH(n) = UH(1 − n) for all n.
Recall that the second-best number n∗L of recipients treated by provider L
maximizes the function K(n) given by (3). We want to show that n∗L > n
∗∗
L
when n∗∗L > 1/2. The proof proceeds in three steps:
1. Let n˜L = 1 − n
∗∗
L < 1/2. Since UH(n) = UH(1 − n) and SL increases
below n∗∗L , the maximum of K on [n˜L, n
∗∗
L ] is achieved above 1/2.
2. Since SL is increasing and UH is decreasing on the interval [1/2, n
∗∗
L ],
K is increasing on this interval, implying that the maximum of K on
[n˜L, n
∗∗
L ] is achieved at n
∗∗
L .
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3. By symmetry of UH and monotonicity of SL on the intervals [0, n
∗∗
L ]
and [n∗∗L , 1], we have
K(n)−K(1− n) = SL(n)− SL(1− n) ≥ SL(1)− SL(1− n
∗∗
L ) > 0
for all n ≥ n∗∗L . It follows that the maximum of K(n) on [0, 1] is
achieved at the right of n∗∗L .
By Proposition 2, the maximum is achieved strictly above n∗∗L .
This global result is closely reminiscent of Proposition 2: The number
of recipients is distorted upwards from the first-best optimum if the agency
prefers the inefficient provider (the one faced with less dispersed individual
treatment costs) to treat a sufficiently high number of recipients.
The new global condition in Proposition 3 depends on whether treating
all the population is socially preferred to treating only a fraction 1− n∗∗L . It
should be satisfied in practice: if the first-best optimum recommends to treat
n∗∗L = 80% of the population, the agency should prefer providing universal
coverage to treating only 1− n∗∗L = 20% of the population.
2
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